Resource-origins of Nonmonotonicity by Gabbay, Dov M. & Woods, John
Studia Logica (2008) 88: 85–112
DOI: 10.1007/s11225-008-9100-2 © Springer 2008
Dov Gabbay
John Woods
Resource-origins of
Nonmonotonicity
Abstract. Formal nonmonotonic systems try to model the phenomenon that common
sense reasoners are able to “jump” in their reasoning from assumptions ∆ to conclusions
C without their being any deductive chain from ∆ to C. Such jumps are done by various
mechanisms which are strongly dependent on context and knowledge of how the actual
world functions. Our aim is to motivate these jump rules as inference rules designed to
optimise survival in an environment with scant resources of eﬀort and time. We begin with
a general discussion and quickly move to Section 3 where we introduce ﬁve resource prin-
ciples. We show that these principles lead to some well known nonmonotonic systems such
as Nute’s defeasible logic. We also give several examples of practical reasoning situations
to illustrate our principles.
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1. Psychologism
Much is said against psychologism in logic, not all of it convincing. Boole’s
logic is psychologistic [2, pp. 4 and 32]. It is a logic of the ‘laws of thought’.
Frege leveled some hefty criticisms against Boole, but he never criticized him
for his psychologism. On the face of it, this is more than odd, since Frege’s
hostility to psychologism is legendary. It turns out that the psychologism
against which Frege railed is a rather narrow thing, and certainly not the
general idea that logic investigates the laws of thought. One thing that Frege
did reject is the view — which he appeared to think is present, implicitly
perhaps, in Mill’s System of Logic [18] — that the laws of logic have the
character of well-conﬁrmed empirical generalizations of experimental scien-
ce. A second thing that Frege rejected was that there is nothing more to the
validity of logical laws than their intersubjective validity, that is, their accep-
tance by the relevent research communities. For all its notational austerity,
Frege’s Begriﬀsschift [5] reﬂected a view of the human reasoner. It is that
the human reasoner cannot hit the standards of clarity and rigour required
by pure mathematics by using a human language — this, too, was Peirce’s
view. Accordingly, what the human reasoner requires is a suitably powerful
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artiﬁcial language, a language of the sort that Frege is at pains to describe
in this seminal work.
This view of what the human reasoner can and cannot do embodies an
insight into the cognitive psychology of beings like us. This makes Frege a
psychologicist in a way not at all uncongenial to his ambitions for logic. In
taking this view, Frege also implicitly endorses a resource-principle, to the
eﬀect that what counts as good reasoning for beings like us is inﬂuenced by
what beings like us are able to do. We may say, then, that the Begriﬀsschift
was the ﬁrst contribution by a modern logician to what the present authors
have called a target-based, resource-dependent conception of logic (TR-logic).
However, what Frege did not do was put these assumptions to the critical
test, either empirically or formally. He assumed that the reasoning sanc-
tioned in his technical logical writings was psychologically real at least to a
non-trivial degree of approximation. While there is no doubt that Frege was
a resource-oriented psychologicist about logic, it may be doubted whether the
assumptions that drove this view were accurate. Certainly it may be doubted
that in any plausible sense of approximation the human reasoner is an ap-
proximate executor of, say, classical predicate logic. Much of logic’s own de-
velopment in the past half-century gives credence to these reservations. As
these developments ﬁnd favour in their respective research communities, we
may say that the ‘trouble’ with predicate logic is not that it is psychologistic
and not that it is resource-dependent. Rather, what is ‘wrong’ with predi-
cate logic is that its psychological and resource assumptions are unrealistic
in ways that call their utility as a theory of human reasoning seriously into
question. In previous writings, we have suggested that, when taken as such
a theory, predicate logic is descriptively thin and normatively dubious [8;
10]. In the present essay, we wish to investigate the following proposition:
That the origins of nonmonotonic logics lie in the coils of dissatisfaction with
the descriptive and normative inadequacies of predicate logic, especially as
regards the factor of resource-dependency.
The ﬁrst systematic study of logic as a distinct discipline can be found
in Aristotle. He developed a system of logic as a necessary tool to facilitate,
among other things, the study of the other arts and sciences, including most
notably argumentation theory. In Aristotle’s hands, logic was a humanities
discipline. Aristotle’s was the dominant position from ancient times to well
into the 19th century, when logic took an evolutionary leap and developed
(following Boole, De Morgan, Frege, Russell and others) into the predicate
logic of today. The logic of the Frege–Russell tradition is studied almost
exclusively with reference to mathematics and, to this day, bears the name
‘mathematical logic’. With the introduction of mathematical logic, the gene-
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ral study of logic also took a 100 year detour — the main eﬀort moved from
human-oriented investigations towards applications in mathematics. Indeed,
even the beginnings of the theory of computation (famously developed by
Church and Turing) is still taught in some symbolic logic classes today as a
piece of ‘meta-mathematics’.
Around the middle of the 20th century a new urgent push was given
to logic by investigation of the human agent in his daily activities and be-
haviour. The impetus started with artiﬁcial intelligence and computer sci-
ence which wanted to develop devices, programs and theories to assist or
even replace human activity.
Logic was heavily used by these disciplines and was forced to evolve even
further to be able to respond to the needs of the applications. Soon the
application of these new devices and programs spread into natural language,
law, psychology, decision theory, communications, robotics, computational
philosophy, philosophy of science, and so on. The social impact of the de-
velopment of computers, robotics and communication stimulated the use of
logic in the respective sciences and forced a parallel development in logic
itself. In practice, this consisted in scientists in each local discipline devel-
oping their own logics and systems as they were required. The result was
chaotic landscape of new ‘logics’.
Under the impetus of computer science, logic is well on its way towards
recovering its historic mission as a study of human reasoning. In making
this turn from pure mathematics, logicians have shown a readiness to ad-
mit agents as load-bearing notions of their theories. In classical computer
science, as well as standard systems of belief dynamics and rational deci-
sion theory, agents are conceived of as self-aware thinking creatures, whose
rationality consists in reﬂective deliberation about ends and means, central
to which is the maximization of subjective utilities. Possibly the most ex-
aggerated versions of this assumption are Savage’s [22] invention of utility
functions over possible future possibilities of the world, and De Finetti’s [4]
conceit that once a probability distribution is at hand, all subsequent be-
lief revisions will be eﬀected by conditioning and nothing else. Of course,
everything that is known empirically about human reasoning makes it clear
that long-term computations are rarely made by individual reasoners on the
ground [15]. This faces the would-be theorist of human reasoning with an
obvious choice. He can acknowledge what the empirical record reveals but
marginalize it in his theory, either by charging actual reasoners with sys-
tematic and widespread irrationality or by reconstituting these descriptively
inadequate assumptions as normative rules which ideally rational agents fol-
low by deﬁnition and which being like us somehow approximate to. The
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theorist’s second option is to accept what the empirical record reveals and
give it a central place in his investigations. In previous work, we have tried to
make it clear why we think the ﬁrst of these options should be resisted [10].
Option two orients a logic of human reasoning to the facts of psychological
reality. It embeds the assumption that, once we admit agents to logic, it
is best to admit them as they actually are, warts and all. Since beings like
us come with psychologies as standard equipment, it would be feckless to
attempt to divine the norms of human thinking without taking due notice
of how the human reasoner is actually constituted, of what his interests are
and what he is capable of.
No one doubts that in re-admitting psychological factors into logic, that
the logician and the psychologist will bring to bear diﬀerent preoccupations
and diﬀerent skills. Roughly speaking, they will reﬂect what they are re-
spectively interested in and will deploy the theoretical techniques that they
are respectively good at. In this there is no occasion for what John Macna-
mara calls a “border dispute” [17]. One measure of the respective parties’
success is the research literature that ﬂows from their eﬀorts. Another is
the extent to which these literatures take note of one another. Our view is
that, in taking the practical turn, logic has re-committed to psychologism.
At present one can only speculate on the likelihood of its success. Logicians
have yet to generate the requisite research literature. And they have not yet
developed the habit of talking to their colleagues in psychology. Short of an
impossibility proof, there is only one way to gauge the value of a psycholog-
ically faithful logic of reasoning. Produce the literature and engage in the
conversations. Then we’ll see.
In previous writings,1 we have generated a conceptual model of individ-
ual thinkers as a paradigm of practical agency, and we have characterized
the practical agent as one who prosecutes his cognitive agendas with com-
paratively slight cognitive resources, such as information, time, and storage
and computational capacities, and who sets the cognitive bar at heights that
enable them to be negotiated with the resources at hand. By these lights, it
is characteristic of the practical agent to be a cognitive economizer, to favour
in most things satisﬁcing strategies over maximizing strategies. This matters
for TR-logics in an obvious way. It suggests that the norms of individual hu-
man reasoning must reﬂect the constraints on how practical agency operates
in actual conditions. In particular, it must seek to ﬁnd in such norms indica-
tions of their value in an individual’s cognitive economy of scant resources.
In this paper, we want to try to locate the origins of nonmonotonicity in this
1[8; 9; 12; 13].
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conception of the resource-and design-bound practical agent. We take it as
empirically given that the individual agent’s reasoning behaviour is domi-
nantly nonmonotonic. When we say that our intention is to seek the origins
of these nonmonotonic proclivities, what we have in mind is that they have
been generated by the psychological constitution of the individual cognitive
agent, in tandem with the nature and extent of his resource-dependencies.
As we hope to show, the individual reasoner operates in a cognitive economy
of comparatively scant resources, and is rationally conditioned not to set his
cognitive targets at heights that typically out-reach those resources. Seen
this way, our nonmonotonic proclivities have an economic rationale. They
assist the individual agent to prosecute his cognitive agendas eﬃciently.
Let us ﬁrst make some formal observations. There is a wide variety
of diverse formal logics grouped together under the name “nonmonotonic”
since it suﬃces for a logic to be nonmonotonic that it have a nonmonotonic
consequence relation. If ∆ is a database and A a wﬀ, |∼ is nonmonotonic
consequence precisely if it is jointly possible that ∆|∼A but ∆ + B |∼ A,
where ∆ + B denotes the result of adding B to ∆.
The problem with the notion of nonmonotonicity is that it is not a char-
acterising property of logics but rather an indication of a lack of a property,
monotonicity, which may fail for many diﬀerent reasons. We therefore seek
some thematic principles which can generate nonmonotonicity and hope to
classify the wide variety and diversity of the class of nonmonotonic systems,
using these principles. We are looking for humanly oriented principles and
not formal principles. Formal principles do exist. In fact, they are (formally)
very attractive. They have the form:
• Take a monotonic consequence , change it in a prescribed mathematical
way (say π) either syntactically or semantically, and this yields a new
nonmonotonic consequence |∼π.
The semantic methods work by way of the condition:
• A  B iﬀ in all models MA of A,B holds.
Then we use a selection function f on sets of models and deﬁne
• A|∼
f
B iﬀ B holds in all models of f(MA).
The syntactical methods work by way of the condition:
• A  B iﬀ for all X ∈ Wﬀ , A ∧B  X iﬀ A  X.
Choose a suitable set ∆ ⊆ Wﬀ and let
• A|∼∆B iﬀ for all X ∈ ∆ we have A ∧B  X iﬀ  X.
The above formal principles yield a good many logics. But what is their
intuitive meaning in terms of our day-to-day existence? We are seeking, as we
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said, some human principles, which generate the nonmonotonic systems.
Here are some candidates.
1. Nonmonotonicity arising from the need of constant revision and change
(investigated initially by Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [14]).
2. Nonmonotonicity arising from bringing meta-level considerations into the
object level (new investigations by the authors).
3. Nonmonotonicity arising from resource limitation of reasoning agents
(which is the subject of this paper).
We are looking now at the resource and time limitation problems of
human beings. We will identify several reasonable ‘simplifying’ principles
humans use to facilitate reasoning in their everyday existence with which
they compensate for their limited cognitive resources. We shall use these
principles to derive some well known nonmonotonic systems.
Suppose that it is, as we ourselves believe, true that the human agent is
one who in general must prosecute his cognitive agendas under press of scant
resources, including rather centrally, resources such as information, time and
storage and computational capacity. Agents thus positioned we identify as
practical agents.2 It would seem to follow that practical agents execute their
cognitive tasks with the aid of various scant-resource adjustment strategies
(SRAS), which all applies to serve their cognitive ends rather well.
We need to say how the principle of scarce resource generate new non-
monotonic systems. We need to compare it with the mathematical way.
Suppose A  B. A human will use proof theory to work his way form A to
B. If he is resource bounded he will take shortcuts, compute approximations,
estimates, etc. Call his way of handling things quickly by π.
Then the question of showing that A ?B through some human chain of
reasoning (with inﬁnite resource) which may or may not be successful will
turn into the question A|∼π?B, when we apply π to the process, and thus
limiting the resources available to the process.
At ﬁrst sight we may think that less can be deduced now. It may be
the case that A  B can be demonstrated if we have enough resources, but
with the limitations imposed by π, we may have A |∼π B. This is true if
all the processes involved are monotonic. However, if A  B involves some
2Correspondingly, a “theoretical” agent is typically a collective or institutional enter-
prise where command of the requisite resources is greater and cognitive tasks are those
appropriate for such resource-reaches. One might mention Nato in this connection, or
present-day particle physics. For a more detailed discussion of this interpretation of the
distinction between practical and theoretical agents, see [Gabbay and Woods, 2005].
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principle such as failure, then π may increase the chances of failure and thus
can deduce more.
For example, in logic programming we may have the database ∆ below
with ∆  q, (¬ is negation as failure)
1. ¬p → q
2. p → a
3. p
If we limit the ‘use’ of p to once only, (as we do in linear logic) then by
deducing a we use up p and hence we can later deduce q as well!
2. Resource-dependency and heuristics
There is a substantial consensus that, even when it operates satisfactorily,
short-cut reasoning is reasoning faute de mieux or “on the cheap”. This
opinion lies at the heart of the doctrine that what is gained by a heuristic
will be oﬀset by its diminished epistemic payoﬀ, and accordingly, that the
faute de mieux character of heuristic reasoning convicts the reasoning of a
lesser degree of rationality than its superior cousin, were it only available to
beings like us. But on a resource-based approach to logic, and the notion of
rationality that it embeds, the faute de mieux assumption cannot be right.
In particular, it cannot be right to claim superiority for a mode of reasoning
that lies beyond a human’s competence, provided that the reasoning that
does lie within it operates successfully. There is a fabled cow that jumped
over the moon. No one doubts that here is a being who jumped higher than
any human has ever dreamt of. But it would be a weak joke to conclude
from this that even the best of human jumpers are pretty small beer. No,
the best of human jumpers are the best that the physical and psychological
constitution of the human animal admits of. It is not much diﬀerent with
human reasoners. An individual thinker’s success is not constituted by his
simulation of the behaviour of a logical god. He achieves his success by
tending to his knitting: by tailoring his cognitive targets to his interests
and to his wherewithal for attaining them. There is an external test of the
soundness of this conception of an individual agent’s rational success. It
is behaviour which collectively and over time satisﬁes the Enough Already
Principle:
Collectively and historically, human agents are right enough enough
of the time about enough of the right things to survive and prosper,
and occasionally build great civilizations.
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3. Five resource principles
Among a practical agent’s resource-compensation strategies are the following
principles:
(a1) He divides his world into natural kinds.
(a2) He is a hasty generaliser, or ‘thin-slicer’.
(a3) He does not have much time or resource and therefore tends to ap-
proximate/cut short any lengthy process.
(a4) He is cautiously impulsive. In particular, he has eﬃcient feedback
mechanisms. If things don’t feel right, then he makes a sudden change
of course.
(a5) Central to our agents existence/survival is the need to take quick
action and so all reasoning tasks are designed to serve/enable actions.
Our agent has little time for irrelevant considerations.
Discussion of (a1) and (a2)
The meaning of (a1) is that the human divides the world into classes (deno-
tata of unary predicates) C1(x), C2(x), . . .. As a ﬁrst attempt at modelling,
we assume this classiﬁcation is crisp, namely the predicates Ci(x) are two
valued. However, we know from experience that any classiﬁcation attempt
with limited resources will encounter items which are diﬃcult to classify
exactly. This naturally invites fuzzy predicates. We shall discuss this at a
later section. The logical machinery developed for the crisp case will need
to be modiﬁed for the fuzzy case.
(a2) means that he is hasty in generalising relationships between these
classes. If our agent twice felt sick eating certain leaves, then he generalises
that these leaves are not edible. There is no time to investigate. Conse-
quently our low-resource agent is going to have three kinds of rules. (Our
language has literals of the form +P (x) = P (x) or −P (x) = ¬P (x).):
1. Absolute rules of the form
±P1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ ±Pn(x) → ±Q(x)
These rules are absolute because they follow from the meaning of the
predicates. They are not hasty generalisations based on experience.
Example:
• Penguin(x) → Bird(x)
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When a rule has the form ∅→ ±Q(x) (i.e. no ±Pi(x) exist), we regard
this as a fact. The agent observed something of x and used the predicate
Q to characterise it. We use a single arrow ‘→’ for absolute rules.
2. Hasty generalisation rules of the form
±P1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ ±Pn(x) ⇒ ±Q(x).
Our agents noticed some examples b1, . . . , bk where there is a connection
between
∧
i±Pi(bj) and ±Q(bj) and generalised it into a rule. He may
have tried, e.g. Mill’s method, to do some tests, but he bears in mind
that this rule may hit some counterexamples. We use ⇒ (double arrow)
for defeasible rules. ∅⇒ Q(x) is called a presumption (Nute [19]).
Example:
• Bird(x) ⇒ Fly(x)
• Penguin(x) ⇒ ¬Fly(x).
3. The third kind of rule is (what Nute calls a defeater) the realisation that
under a certain combination of circumstances (
∧
i±Pi(x)) it is better not
to conclude anything. We write this as
±P1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ ±Pn(x) — ±Q(x).
(read — as ⇒ streamlined).
This is a safety mechanism since some rules are hasty generalisations,
and our agent knows when to be careful!
Discussion of (a3)
For large ranges of cases, a practical agent does not have much time to spend.
So if he is looking for something and cannot ﬁnd it in the obvious places,
he jumps to the conclusion it is not there. This is ‘negation as failure’. An-
other aspect of (a3) are various approximations of various arguments/proof
systems: ‘Cannot prove A in k steps then it is not provable’. ‘Anyone who
objects to this marriage, let him come forth now!’, etc.
Of course our agent realises his conclusions depend on the information
currently available and on how much time and eﬀort he is able to devote to
his reasoning.
To draw a conclusion we must use as much data as possible (given our
time and other resources) as bears relevantly on our task. However, our
conclusions could have changed had we more time and information).
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Example 3.1 (for (a1), (a2):). So for example the database
Bird(x) ⇒ Fly(x)
Penguin(x)→ Bird(x)
Penguin(x)⇒ ¬Fly(x)
Bird(a)
Penguin(a)
would conclude ¬Fly(a).
Since we must use all available information that bears relevantly on our
task, a rule of the form
∧
i Pi(x) ⇒ ±Q is weaker than a rule of the form
P (x) ∧
∧
i Pi(x) ⇒ (x) because it is based on less data.
3
Our third principle (a3) assumes that in some cases, the agent tries to ﬁnd
all elements in a class C(). For some classes he may feel he has information
enough to practically assume that if x cannot be deduced to have property
C(x), then it is defeasibly in ¬C(x). For such classes we have what is known
in modern terms as the negation by failure rule, which we can present as
fail((C(x)) ⇒ ¬C(x)
Note that this rule is “on the run” rule. fail means “fail to deduce using local
resources”. There may not be enough time to conduct an exhaustive search.
Discussion of (a4)
Our agent does not have much time to spend. So if he is looking for some-
thing or is doing something and it doesn’t feel right, he immediately aborts
and runs away. Principle (a4) is really a Neural Net principle, where we
form an opinion/recognition all of a sudden.The previous (a1)–(a3) are more
rule based.
Imagine an insurance salesman trying to persuade you to buy some in-
surance. At some point he might realise (all of a sudden) that you are not
going to buy. He will suddenly thank you and leave. This does not happen,
by the way, with Jehovah Witnesses. They never leave. Nor does it happen
with large organisations; they are very slow to shift.
It is well known that single agents respond to feedback and criticism
much more quickly than large organisations. Large bureaucracies do not like
impulsive reactions. They tend to substitute rules, regulations and red tape.
3Imagine one harassed hasty generaliser saying to another: “Don’t touch these pointed
leaves, they are poisonous’, and he gets the reply: “Yes, but I am boiling them before
eating them!”.
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Discussion of (a5)
Another aspect connected to the (a3) and (a5) principles is a local default
rule. It’s role is to save on time and eﬀort in checking the extension of a
predicate C(x). We may decide on the basis of evidence α(x) that if C(x) is
locally consistent with our current view of the world then we can add C(x)
as the true world. We write this rule as
α(x) :
C(x)
C(x)
This may look like Reiter’s default rule, but it is not. Reiter’s machinery [20]
is not practical, and we doubt whether his particular conception of default
is at all realistic. Imagine an agent wanting to execute an action a. a
has precondition A and postcondition B. He gathers evidence A′ to check
whether A holds and ﬁnds that it is consistent to assume A given the A′
he has got. He might feel conﬁdent to proceed with the action. We note
here that large institutions are more cautious and have more resources and
tend therefore not to use defaults so much. They would investigate further.
What we have here is that our agent who is on the run while trying to make
some deductions to guide his next step may choose to add some locally
consistent C(x) which makes sense in his current context. Note that the fail
rule and the default rule complement one another, one for the positive and
one for negative information. The local default rule cannot be perceived as
a hasty generalisation of the form α(x) ∧ fail(¬C(x)) ⇒ C(x). The latter
means a more systematic check of fail. Recall ¬C(x) itself involves failure.
The rule can be understood in such a way that in the presence of α(x),
failure to show ¬C(x) indicates that C(x) holds.4
4. Sample systems
We are now ready to formulate our ﬁrst system. We choose a labelled for-
mulation.
4Imagine for example that you are trying very quickly to check whether the library has
a certain book on logic. You scan the shelves and ﬁnd nothing. You deduce it doesn’t
have the book; i.e. ¬H(b). Then you realise they were shelves in the annex. So the search
failed to be reasonably exhaustive. This is fail (¬H(b)). Of course, ordinarily you would
not want to conclude H(b) from this. But if you are an inspector evaluating the library
for adequacy, you might have to.
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Definition 4.1 (A limited resource model for a simple agent). The language
contains unary predicates, constants and variables, negation ¬ and various
other notation as follows:
1. A literal has the form P (x) (positive) or ¬P (x) negative. It is grounded
if it has the form ±P (a), where a is a constant.
Let Ai, B be literals
2. An absolute rule has the form
∧
i
Ai(x) → B(x)
3. A defeasible rule has the form
R(x) :
∧
i
Ai(x) ⇒ B(x)
4. A safeguard (defeater) has the form
R(x) :
∧
I
Ai(x) — : B(x)
5. A negation by failure rule has the form
R(x) : fail((C(x)) ⇒ ¬C(x)
6. A default rule
R(x) :
∧
i
Ai(x) :
B(x)
B(x)
7. A theory ∆ is a set of grounded literals and various rules. We can assume
that all items in ∆ are labelled (named). The language of names is a
completely separate language used just to enable us to trace proofs. Thus
∆ can be assumed to have the form
l1 : A1, . . . , lk : Ak
r1(x) : R1(x), . . . , rm(x) : Rn(x)
where Ai are literals and Ri are rules. The letters li name the literals
available and may be a more complex label giving more information about
the literal.
We now explain how we reason with such a database.
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Example 4.2. Let ∆ be
l1: Penguin(a)
l2: Genetically-engineered (a) (GE(a))
l3: Penguin (b)
R1(x): Penguin(x)⇒ ¬ Fly(x)
R2(x): Bird(x)⇒ Fly(x)
R3(x): Penguin(x)→ Bird(x)
R4(x): fail(Penguin(x)) ⇒ ¬ Penguin(x)
R5(x): GE(x) ∧ ¬ Penguin(x) ⇒ Fly(x)
R6(x): Fly(x) :
Bird(x)
Bird(x)
l4: GE(c).
We can prove Bird(c) as follows.
We ﬁrst note that Penguin(c) fails. Then we deduce ¬Penguin(c), and
from this we deduce Fly(c).
Note that in the proof theory for such a system the defaults are not
Reiter defaults. In other words, given A : B
B
and A : ¬B
¬B
, we choose the one
we want to enable actions and carry on. There is no question of considering
extensions,etc.
Another point to consider is that the default ∆ : X
X
can be read context-
sensitively. If all we know is ∆ and X is consistent then we can add X.
Reiter’s default is monotonic, i.e. if we know more than ∆ and X is consistent
we can add X. This point has already been addressed in [7, pp. 240–246].
5. Example
It would be good to illustrate our principles in some reasonable real life
example.
Mrs Smith holds a million pound life insurance policy on her husband,
issued many years ago, when they were married. The premium is paid
July 1st every year by cheque. If the premium is not paid by July 15th
the policy lapses. Mrs Smith posted a cheque on July 1st by ordinary
post. On July 7th there was a terrorist attack at King’s Cross. Mr.
Smith was in the area and (as a result of the shock of the bomb-
ing) died of a heart attack. Because of an administrative error, Mrs
Smith’s cheque was not cashed by the insurance company until Au-
gust. An internal record exists at the insurers showing the cheque
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arrived on July 3rd. Mrs Smith’s lawyer is presented with two logical
statements5
∆1: Mr Smith dies ∧¬ by terror → insurance money
∆2: Mr Smith dies ∧ by terror → government money
The policy has the usual clause that cases of terrorism and war are not
covered. The Government has special funds to compensate victims
of terrorism. The question is was Mr Smith’s heart attack to be
considered as caused by the terror attack or just a coincidence with it?
∆1 and ∆2 are databases of evidence supporting the statements. ∆1
needs to establish that the policy was in force in July and ∆2 needs
to establish the form and reason of death.
Mrs Smith’s lawyer realises he has two options
1. Establish that Mr Smith died as an (indirect) result of the terror-
ist attack and claim money from the government’s special fund.
2. Claim the heart attack is not a result of terror and claim money
from the life insurance company.
To pursue option 2 he needs to establish the validity of the insurance
policy. To this end he needs to get hold of the record of receipt of
the cheque at the insurers. He is afraid that the insurers will delete
the record and claim that the cheque was posted too late. They
would reason backwards: the cheque was cashed in August, they
have ‘failed’ to ﬁnd a record of receipt and so, by common sense
reasoning, this implies that the cheque arrived at the end of July.
The point of the above story can be grasped by an ordinary person
immediately, but its formal logic however is quite complex. It involves
5In claiming injury, two factors are generally involved. That of causation (“but for X; Y
would not have happened”) and that of remoteness (in tort is “reasonable forseeability”).
Causation is much easier to show. Remoteness is diﬀerent. The government wants to
limit the number of people who can claim (e.g. claims like “he saw the terrorist attack
live on TV and thought his daughter may have been there and had a heart attack as a
result”). In such a case causation will be shown but reasonable forseeability may not.
Thus they would want to put the highest hurdle possible to exclude a maximal number
of claimants. So they will probably require direct presence at the event. The insurance
company also wants to exclude the maximal number of people from claiming and they
do this by making the exclusion to their liability of terrorist attack as wide as possible.
They want their deﬁnition of death by terrorist attack to be as wide as possible. So they
would have only the causation test and no requirement of remoteness or direct presence.
So the two institutions may have diﬀerent tests for what the commonsense “lay” cause of
death is.
If the tests of “lay” causation are diﬀerent, Mrs Smith could lose both claims.
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1. Labels for time
2. A variety of contexts.
3. The lawyer’s simulation and reasoning of what the insurance company
might do is a yet higher level (call it the meta-level) involving the fol-
lowing principles:
(a) Deletion of data from a database
(b) Use of negation as failure
(c) The temporal advance of events using actions
(d) Considerations of consistency and conﬂict of laws
(e) Consideration of actions to be taken now because of possible simu-
lated future scenarios
4. The overriding problem is resource-oriented. Time and money.
Let us ﬁrst approach the problem intuitively, as friends of Mrs Smith
and see how we can reason on her behalf.
We see two weak points in her claim from the insurance company (‘weak’
in the sense that the insurance company may make it diﬃcult or impossible
to claim).
1. The question of whether the policy was renewed in time. There should be
a record of the date of receipt. Would the company destroy the record?
If it is a big bureaucracy then it is not likely. Even so, we must get
conﬁrmation of the date of receipt.
2. The second question is how to establish that the heart attack was not
caused by the explosion? This can be very much context dependent on
where exactly Mr Smith was at the moment of the explosion and whether
he was hit by the blast. It may also depend on whether he had a weak
heart or not.
Let us make the following assumptions:
1. It is unlikely that the insurance company would ‘not ﬁnd’ a record of
recept of the cheque.
2. It is a legal and medical problem whether the blast should be considered
as directly responsible for the death of Mr Smith.
3. The government is not likely to pay as much as the insurance company.
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A
±x
−→ B
Figure 1.
Under the circumstances it may look better to claim that the heart at-
tack was indirectly caused by the blast and claim compensation from the
government. If the government denies compensation on the grounds that
death was not caused by the blast then one can use this ruling and claim
from the insurance company.
This raises the question of resources. If a claim is made from the govern-
ment, who has the burden of proof that the death was caused by the blast?
Is it the claimant? or should the government prove the death was not caused
by the blast? The process of proof is costly.
Alternatively, should we claim from the insurance company on the basis
of easy-to-prove ‘death’? Is it then the insurance company’s responsibility to
prove that the death was caused by the blast and hence by terrorist activity?
This seems more likely but what the insurance company might do in practice
is to refuse to pay and let Mrs Smith simply be forced to sue. Even so, the
burden of proof still shall probably be on them.
Let us now see how we would represent our options and reasoning for-
mally. Writing all the above statements in some logical language is not good
enough. We would lose the transparency of the strucutres involved. We
think we can do better using several formalisms and linking them together
by a suitable meta-level logical device. We try to keep close to how a human
would do it.
Obviously, we need at least three major components:
1. a time/action diagram
2. an argument network presenting the major arguments and counterargu-
ments
3. a resource considerations map.
Let A,B denote arguments. We use ﬁgure 1 to denote the situation
where argument A attacks (−x) B with strength x or supports (+x) B with
strength x, for x a number between 0 and 1. For a study of this model
see [1].
Using this notation we can write
D = insurance company deletes the receipt record of Mrs Smith’s cheque.
E = Insurance company will save £1m.
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F = Insurance company is a bureaucratic organisation with distributed
responsibility and procedures.
F
E
D
−0.9
+0.2
Figure 2.
Figure 2 now represents the relationship between these arguments. We
need to combine these two numbers (+0.2,−0.9) to get a new, probably high
number, attacking the notion that the receipt record will be deleted.
Similarly let
P1 = Mr Smith was shocked by the blast
P2 = Mr Smith died of a heart attack
P3 = Death was caused by the blast.
P4 = Legal and medical argument that although the bast is a secondary
possible cause for the heart attack it is not to be considered the cause
of death.
P2 ∧ P1
P4
−0.5
+0.8
•P3
Figure 3.
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Available actions
action precondition postcondition
a = ask for conﬁr-
mation of receipt of
cheque
none insurance policy
valid
b = ﬁle claim with
insurance company
valid policy and
death certiﬁcate
claim considered
c = ﬁle claim with
government
State Mr Smith was
hurt by shock of
the blast (cause of
death?)
claim considered
d = insurance com-
pany claims death
caused by act of ter-
ror
P3 claim b not valid
e = government cla-
ims death not caused
by act of terror
¬P3 claim e not valid
f = appeal to public
opinion
seeming injustice by
public bodies against
the victim Mr Smith.
hopefully some re-
sulting solution
Calculation of cost
Obviously a lot hinges on P3, whether the blast is to be considred cause of
death. It is costly to establish P3 or ¬P3. All the other costs are relatively
low. So the course of action to be taken is the one which minimises the cost
to Mrs Smith. Here is one option:
Step 1: Take action a
Step 2: Take action b
In the event that the insurance company takes action d then challenge
them to establish P3. Try to get an immediate response from the insurance
company on whether they are going to take action d or not.
Step 3: In the event of action d, claim from goverment (action c) providing
the proof the insurance company put forward asserting P3, therefore the
government is responsible. If the government take action e, then hold a
press conference (action f).
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t6
t5
t4
t3
t2
t1
now
a
b
c
d
e
f
end
end
Figure 4.
It is painfully clear that the overriding consideration here is that of cost
and resource availability. The common sense normal course of action seems
to be to claim from both the insurance company and the government. But
Mrs Smith cannot risk the cost of the process of facing government bureau-
cracy. So she is claiming only from the insurance. The insurance company
may also delete documents from the database in order to save money and the
only reason they might not do that is again the complexity of its bureaucracy.
Time action ﬂow
The above suggess the time action ﬂow of Figure 4, ti are time points. Time
‘ticks’ because of actions taken.
6. Another Example: Fallacies
In 1970, C.L. Hamblin fulminated against logicians for having given up on
the fallacies programme, abandoning it to the writers of ﬁrst-year textbooks,
who, whether out of incompetence or indiﬀerence, conﬁned themselves to
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rather foolish caricatures [16]. Hamblin was of the view that the revival of
the fallacies programme would require the admittance of agents to logical
theory, and he saw the logic of dialogue as a natural way to link the be-
haviour of agents to one of the contexts in which fallacies naturally arise. In
so proposing, Hamblin adopted what he took to be (we think rightly) the
traditional conception of fallacies as arguments or inferences that are
1. errors
2. attractive6
3. universal, that is, widely committed.
4. incorrigible, that is, subject to high levels of post-diagnostic recidivism.
Hamblin was a comparatively rare logician who took pains to learn the
history of the subject, and his book is much enriched by this knowledge.
But he also tended to accept as loosely canonical in 1970 that list of falla-
cies which Woods [24] has baptized “The Gang of Eighteen”. In [26] they
are the following: ad baculum, ad hominem, ad misericordiam, ad popu-
lum, ad verecundiam, ad ignorantiam, post hoc ergo propter hoc, aﬃrming
the consequent, denying the antecedent, begging the question, equivocation,
amphiboly, biased statistics, composition and division, faulty analogy, gam-
bler’s, ignoratio elenchi, and hasty generalization. In the tradition from
which the Gang of Eighteen has evolved, the received view is that, whatever
else might be said about them, the error they commit is either deductive in-
validity or inductive weakness (in the technical sense developed by the main
approaches to conﬁrmation theory.) One of the beneﬁts of paying attention
to what human individuals are actually like — what they are interested in
and capable of doing — is that it helps us see that in a quite general way
errors are relative to the cognitive targets agents have set for themselves and
to the attainment-standards which those targets embed. If someone seeks
a proof of a proposition in category theory, then he will fail if his proferred
demonstration is invalid. Producing that demonstration would be an er-
ror in the light of that target and that attainment-standard. On the other
hand, to take a rather tendentious example, if someone’s target is to ﬁnd
out whether his neighbour enjoyed last night’s game, it would be seriously
misguided to judge his reasoning an error if it involved the invalid inference
that the neighbour did enjoy himself from the neighbour’s avowal that he
did. This teaches us a valuable lesson about the assessment of reasoning.
6Michael Scriven calls fallacies the “attractive nuisances of argumentation, the ideal
types of improper inference” [23, p. 333].
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Before one faults a person’s reasoning, it is necessary to identify his target
and the standards it imposes. In an obvious sense, then,
• Attribution precedes assessment.
While there are contexts, and targets, that call for the deployment of
valid reasoning, beings like us have a stake in not setting such targets need-
lessly. What is known of the empirical record amply demonstrates that by
and large, beings like us – individual practical agents – do not set targets
that call for validity. The same may be said for targets that call for rea-
soning that is inductively strong. Nato, MI5 and population biology may
more or less routinely set the goal of a scientiﬁc conﬁrmation of its lawlike
generalizations, and may at times bring this oﬀ by the Bayesian machina-
tions of conditional probability. But this, too, is not typically our situation
as individuals. As Mill wisely observed, induction is not for the likes of us;
it is for societies.
From this we have it that as they are traditionally conceived of, the Gang
of Eighteen aren’t fallacies after all. More carefully,
• Either the eighteen aren’t errors, or if they are, they aren’t errors typically
committed by us. Either way, they aren’t — for us – fallacies on the
traditional conception.
This we might call the Negative Thesis. It arises out of an examination
of what the individual agent is typically up to when he reasons. As the
present authors see it, the Negative Thesis is not all that earth-shaking.
It ﬂows rather directly from the Attribute-Precedes-Assessment Thesis in
conjunction with empirical inspection of the reasoning behaviour actually
evinced by human individuals on the ground. A more daring thing to venture
would be the Positive Thesis, to the eﬀect that
• The Gang of Eighteen are cognitively benign scant-resource adjustment
strategies for beings like us.
This is not the place to try to make good on the Positive Thesis.7 For
the present we shall test it only as it applies to hasty generalization.
What would it take for hasty generalization to be a cognitively virtuous
reasoning strategy? What would its virtue consist in? Certainly not its
inductive strength, since all agree that this is what it lacks. But the mere
7This is attempted in [11] in progress.
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fact that the inductive weakness of a benign hasty generalization is not an
error does not constitute itself as a strength. So what does?
We are notorious hasty generalizers. Hasty generalization is as natural to
us as breathing. How, then, can we say that, although we generalize hastily
“all the time”, that we don’t commit the error of hasty generalization with
a frequency required to make it a fallacy? What we want to suggest is that
when we generalize hastily, it is typically not the case that the cognitive
target we will have set for ourselves is one whose attainment standard is in-
ductive strength, that is, the degree of conﬁrmation necessary for the lawlike
generalizations of experimental science. Of course, the reason for this is not
epistemic sloth, but tactical realism. Since in the general case individual
reasoners lack the wherewithal for meeting these standards, typically they
avoid committing themselves to targets that call for them.
If this is right, it must be possible to generalize hastily and correctly in
relation to targets that don’t demand this high degree of inductive strength.
Consider a case. You are tramping in the bush and you see your ﬁrst ocelot,
four legs and all. You say to your guide, “Funny, I always imagined that
ocelots were two-legged.” In generalizing to four, you relied on a single
positive instance, the smallest of non-zero samples. You also got it right.
What accounts for this? Why do we generalize on a single instance of four-
leggedness but not on a single instance of being-spotted-on-Thursday? Per-
haps it has something to do with our aptitude for recognizing natural kinds.
Possible it also matters that when we do generalize in this way, the general-
ization is presumptive rather than unqualiﬁed, and what is generalized to is
a generic claim, rather than a universally quantiﬁed conditional statement
– hence a statement with regard to which an error in a particular case need
not cost you the generalization’s truth.8 Accordingly, the two cases exhibit
some interesting structural diﬀerences.
Case 1
1. For all x, if x is an ocelot, x is four legged. (Universally quantiﬁed
conditional)
2. Therefore, Ozzie the ocelot is four-legged. (An instantiation of (1)).
The “therefore” marks deductive consequence.
8Carlson and Pelletier [3] is the deﬁnitive single-volume reference work for genericity.
Resource-origins of Nonmonotonicity 107
Case 2
1. Ocelots are four-legged. (Generic claim)
2. Ozzie the ocelot is four-legged. (A default from (1))
The “so” marks presumptive consequence.
As we see, with respect to Ozzie the three-legged ocelot, it is possible to
be wrong in particular without being wrong in general. The reason for this
is that, while universally quantiﬁed conditionals are brittle – i.e., falsiﬁed
by a single true negative instance, generic claims are elastic — i.e., they
have the capacity to retain their truth in the face of false instances. In the
ﬁrst case, there are two things to correct, both the faulty instance and the
universal quantiﬁcation it instantiates. In the second case, there is only one
thing to correct, the faulty instance which is now seen as a default from the
generic claim.
A basic appeal of nonmonotonic strategies is that they are feedback-
friendly. They are natural occasion for the eﬃcient and timely correction
of error. They are thus contributions to the agent’s cognitive economy.
Generalizing from a single instance is likewise nonmonotonic, and so are
the subsequent default inferences from what is generalized to. All of this is
economically motivated, mandated by the resource-constraints peculiar to
individual cognitive agents.
7. Introducing Fuzziness
We have mentioned already that our resource-poor agent divides the world
into categories. With lack of resources and lack of time, this division itself
cannot be crisp. So, for example, we may have the following two rules about
hunting:
• Vicious(x) ∧ Big(x) ⇒∼ Hunt(x)
• Tame(x) ∧ Small(x) ⇒ Hunt(x)
• Vicious(x) ∧ Big(x) ∧Hungry ⇒ Hunt(x)
• Tame(x) ∧ Small(x) ∧ Tired⇒∼ Hunt(x)
The predicate Vicious may not be crisp and the predicate Big may not be
crisp. Hunt can be assumed to be crisp. We either Hunt or not Hunt.
Hungry is also not crisp. The question is, when the predicates are fuzzy,
what logic is in play here? So if our crisp rule has the form
±(C1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ ±Cn(x) ⇒ ±C(x)
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we make it fuzzy by oﬀering a rule of the form
(C1(x) = e1) ∧ · · · ∧ (Cn(x) = en) ⇒ (C(x) = e)
where ei and e, 0 ≤ ei, e ≤ 1 are the fuzzy values.
Let us simplify and say that we have three values here for the fuzzy
predicates 1 = yes, 0 = no and 12 = not sure. This is reasonable to assume
as a ﬁrst approximation for our resource-poor agent. Ordinary fuzzy logic
would use a function x ∗ y, combining any two values x and y, which is
monotonic commutative, associative and has a unit. For example we have
• x ∗ y = y ∗ x
• x ∗ 1 = x
• (x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z)
This kind of function already does not work for our nonmonotonic case
because of the nonmonotonicity of the rule with the Hungry predicate.
We have:
• Vicious(x) = 1 ∧ Big(x) = 1 ⇒ Hunt(x) = 0
and
• Vicious(x) = 1 ∧ Big(x) = 1 ∧Hungry = 1⇒ Hunt(x) = 1
The ∗ function cannot be monotonic if we want it to give this result.
The traditional method of making a system fuzzy is to take each compo-
nent of the system and make it fuzzy. In the case of nonmonotonic logic we
need to look at the two methods of representing a nonmonotonic consequence
(|∼π and |∼f of Section 1) and make them fuzzy.
See for example the works of Eva Richter about nonmonotonic fuzzy
logic [21].
However, this ‘global’ approach hardly seems relevant to our poor dis-
tressed and endangered hunting agent. He really wants to know for any
antecedent of his rule of the form
(A1(x) = e1) ∧ (A2(x) = e2) ∧ · · · ∧ (An(x) = en)
What to do; to hunt or not to hunt?
This means that we cannot use a traditional norm ∗ in our model but
we need a new kind of vector function V∗ operating on ﬁnite sequences of
numbers e = (e1, . . . , en), 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 giving a number 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 as value.
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In symbols e = V∗(e). Note that we assume that Hunt is a crisp predicate
and so in this case e = 0 or e = 1.
As an example, let us deﬁne a workable system. We need to make some
assumptions.
1. We divide our predicates into crisp and fuzzy predicates
2. We consider rules of the form
∧
i
(Ci(x) = ei) ⇒ C(x)
where C(x) is crisp and Ci(x) are fuzzy.
3. For each crisp predicate C, we have a valuation function VC giving for
any ﬁnite set of elements of the form {Ci(x) = ei} a value 0 = ⊥ or
1 = . VC says whether the assumptions
∧
i Ci(x) = ei can give us C(x)
as a conclusion.
4. VC satisﬁes the property that for each fuzzy Ci, it is either monotonic
up or monotonic down in Ci(x).
So consider the nonmonotonicity rule:
• Big(x) ∧Vicious(x) ⇒∼ Hunt(x)
Then as far as Hungry is concerned, it encourages one to hunt while Tired
encourages one not Hunt.
So as far as Hunt is concerned, each fuzzy predicate either encourages
hunting or discouraging hunting.9
9We can take a classical (non-fuzzy) nonmonotonic consequence relation |∼ and require
the same property of it. Namely, given any X and any A, we assume that A either
encourages X or the opposite. So we exclude the possibility of items (i)–(iv) all holding:
Encouragement Condition: For arbitrary X,A,D and E the following four conditions
cannot hold:
(i) D|∼X
(ii) D ∧ A |∼ X
(A discourages X)
(iii) E  |∼X
(iv) E ∧A|∼X
(A encourages X)
Such requirement does not turn the nonmonotonic consequence into a monotonic one
(i.e. it does not entail monotonicity). We consider an example of Karl Schlechta. Let
the language contain only one atomic variable p. There are two models m1 = (p = ⊥)
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Our agent looks at the fuzzy data and decides whether to conclude the
target or not. This is quite intuitive.
In fuzzy logic there are uninorms which are monotonic up in one variable
and down in another. So let x ⊕ y be a uninorm (monotonic up in x and
down in y) and let ∗ be a norm. Let the rule be
m∧
i=1
(Ci(x) = ei) ∧
n∧
j=1
(Dj(x) = dj) ⇒ (C(x) = e)
where Ci are encouraging and Dj are discouraging.
Then we can calculate
(e1 ∗ · · · ∗ em)⊕ (d1 ∗ · · · ∗ dm) = e.
So to turn a crisp system of rules of the form
∧
±Ci(x) ∧
∧
±Dj(x) ⇒ ±C(x)
and m2 = (p = ). Let the preference relation put m1 below m2 (this is actually a
circumscription model for p).
Therefore we have A ∧ B = either A or B or ⊥. We have nonmonotonicity because
∅|∼ ∼ p but p |∼∼ p. So this is a genuinely nonmonotonic consequence. We also have
that the encouragement condition holds
First consider p as a target: we have
∅ |∼ p,∼ p |∼ p, p|∼p
If we add p we get
∼ p ∧ p |∼ p and p|∼p
So p encourages the target p.
Let us add ∼ p. We get
∼ p |∼ p and ∼ p ∧ p |∼ p.
So ∼ p discourages the target p.
Second, consider ∼ p as a target. We have:
∅|∼ ∼ p, p |∼∼ p,∼ p|∼ ∼ p.
If we add p we get
p |∼∼ p, p ∧ ∼ p|∼ ∼ p.
So p discourages ∼ p.
If we add ∼ p we get
∼ p|∼ ∼ p, p ∧ ∼ p|∼ ∼ p,
So ∼ p encourages ∼ p.
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into a fuzzy system we provide a ⊕ and a * and decide which predicates
are encouraging and which are not and turn the rule into a fuzzy rule as
above. We need only ensure compatibility with the {0, 1} values of the crisp
rules. So our choice cannot be arbitrary, and we had better start with a
crisp system already satisfying the encouragement condition.
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